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A PRESIDENT AND A CHIEF JUSTICE:
THE DISPARATE DESTINIES OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN
AND ROGER B. TANEY
JAMES F. SIMON, LINCOLN AND CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY,
SLAVERY, SECESSION AND THE PRESIDENT’S WAR POWERS, SIMON & SCHUSTER, 2006
REVIEWED BY ROBERT FABRIKANT*

The title of James Simon’s book tells a lot about his preferences. He
introduces President Abraham Lincoln by surname only, but he seems to
think readers need to be reminded that Roger B. Taney was Chief Justice.
This book presents a good overview of important events leading up to
and which occurred in the midst of the Civil War. Professor Simon seeks to
offer insights into complicated legal issues affecting the relationship between two lawyers who presided over different branches of the federal
government during our country’s most serious constitutional crisis. Simon
does not cover newly unearthed materials, nor does he provide fresh perspectives on the War, or the two men who are the centerpieces of his book.
A major shortcoming is that the book lacks a thesis. At the outset,
Simon tells us that Taney and Lincoln “disagreed on the three fundamental
issues of slavery, secession, and Lincoln’s constitutional authority during
the Civil War.”1 But two paragraphs later, he tells us that “[b]oth men
disapproved of the institution of slavery.”2 Of the three issues, Lincoln and
Taney actually “interacted” only on the issue of Lincoln’s war powers, and
that was limited to their dramatic confrontation regarding Lincoln’s unilateral suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
Despite outward appearances, Taney and Lincoln are an odd couple to
share a book. Taney was more than thirty-two years older than Lincoln.
Apart from the fact that both of them were lawyers with a strong interest in
politics, they had very little in common. Taney and Lincoln had almost no
personal or political interaction. It appears they met only once, on the occasion of Lincoln’s swearing-in, and then only perfunctorily.3 Prior to that
*
Robert Fabrikant is Senior Counsel with Sidley Austin LLP, and an Adjunct Professor at
Howard University School of Law, in Washington, D.C.
1. JAMES F. SIMON, LINCOLN AND CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY, SLAVERY, SECESSION AND THE
PRESIDENT’S WAR POWERS 1 (Simon & Schuster 2006).
2. Id.
3. CARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 542-43 (MacMillan 1935). Taney’s principal
biographer, Carl Brent Swisher, reports a pre-inaugural meeting between Lincoln and Taney,
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meeting, Lincoln, along with countless others, had been highly critical of
Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott,4 which would go down as one of the most
notorious cases in American constitutional history. After that meeting, their
principle interaction came in the habeas corpus controversy.
Taney rose quickly from a patrician, slave-holding family in Maryland
to become Attorney General, then Secretary of the Treasury, under
President Andrew Jackson. Taney led Jackson’s fight against the Second
Bank of the United States, and was rewarded by being named Chief Justice
in 1836 when he was fifty-nine. At the time Taney ascended to the Court,
Lincoln had emerged from lowly birth in Kentucky to become a lawyer and
a state legislator in Illinois. Lincoln won a seat in Congress in 1846, but his
tenure was unexceptional. He served only a single term before returning to
the private practice of law in Illinois.
When Lincoln seemed to be backsliding, Taney was gaining bi-partisan
recognition as a worthy successor to the beloved Chief Justice John
Marshall. But a dramatic reversal of fortune was in the offing for both
Taney and Lincoln as a result of the increasingly bitter conflict between the
North and the South over slavery.
In 1854, Congress repealed the 1820 Missouri Compromise, which had
barred slavery in the federal territories north of the southern boundary of
Missouri. But Congress’s repeal did not settle the matter. It simply ignited
a sectional firestorm regarding the extent to which slavery would be
permitted to extend into the western territories. This was the overarching
political issue of its time because if slavery could not extend west, the slave
states would eventually lose parity in the Senate. It might also signal the
demise of slavery itself, assuming that slave-based economies were as
much in need of territorial expansion (and new markets) as free labor
economies.
The ever-growing conflict over whether slavery would be permitted to
extend westward drew Lincoln back into electoral politics, and propelled
him to the presidency in 1860. The sectional battle over the extension of
slavery affected Taney no less than it did Lincoln, except in precisely the
opposite fashion. Lincoln re-entered politics to defeat the extension of
slavery. Taney, however, sought to preempt by Court opinion in Dred Scott
the issue of slavery extension and take it out of the political realm, or so he
thought.
“[o]ne day late in February [1862] . . . [President-elect Lincoln] accompanied by [Secretary of
State William] Seward . . . visited the Supreme Court in the conference room. It is probable that
he met there for the first time the Chief Justice . . . . No record remains . . . whether such a
meeting occurred and what may have transpired at it.” Id.
4. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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Taney never lost sight of his Southern roots, and was ever ready to
protect slave-holding interests. The Chief Justiceship provided an excellent
perch. His desire to vindicate the South intensified as the North grew in
population, wealth and political power. He saw the survival of slavery as
crucial to the survival of Southern mores, and he believed that the North’s
desire to bar the westward extension of slavery jeopardized the South’s
ability to survive as a countervailing force in the Union. It was for that
reason that in 1857, in the midst of bitter sectional wrangling, he reached
out to hold in Dred Scott that Congress did not have the power to ban
slavery in the federal territories.5
Taney was destined to lose his prestige as a result of Dred Scott, and to
lose his leverage as Chief Justice as a result of the habeas corpus controversy. Lincoln was destined to lose his life as a result of the Civil War and
to enter the pantheon of American heroes.
This mixture of politics, law and martyrdom provides a rich tapestry to
weave a great story. Simon covers the events in a helpful manner, but he
offers few fresh insights into the incredibly disparate destinies of these two
men.
I.

SECESSION

In light of the title of this book, it is surprising that Simon spends less
than twenty pages discussing the issue of secession. Taney and Lincoln had
very different views regarding secession. Taney’s approval of secession
reflected his Southern roots, and his pragmatic conclusion that it was best,
primarily for the South, for the two sections to go their separate ways.
Simon claims that in a letter to former President Franklin Pierce, Taney
“made clear that the Chief Justice, unlike Lincoln, believed the South had a
constitutional right to secede.”6 Contrary to Simon, this letter, written in
the midst of Taney’s habeas corpus battle with Lincoln, makes no reference
to a constitutional right to secede, nor does it shed light on the substance of
Taney’s constitutional reasoning.7

5. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 633. I use the word “hold” reservedly. Taney’s opinion purported
to be for a majority of the justices, but fewer than five of the nine justices concurred in Taney’s
“holding” that the Court did not have jurisdiction (because Dred Scott was not a “citizen”). If the
Court did not have jurisdiction, than its pronouncements regarding Congress’s lack of power to
prohibit slavery in the federal territories would not constitute a “holding.”
6. SIMON, supra note 1, at 194.
7. Simon describes the letter as being dated June 12, 1861, and as being part of the “Pierce
Papers.” SIMON, supra note 1, at 305 n.194. I obtained a copy of the letter from the New
Hampshire Historical Society, Concord, New Hampshire—President Pierce was a son of New
Hampshire. I am not aware of any document, including this letter, which contains Taney’s
constitutional or legal reasoning with respect to the secession issue.
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Taney’s true connection to the issue of secession is that his Dred Scott
decision is often cited as a prime cause for secession. This argument
follows from the holding in that case that Congress had no authority to ban
slavery in the federal territories. This holding, and the gyrations leading up
to it, including an alleged conspiracy between Taney, President James
Buchanan and others, infuriated the North, and sharpened sectionalist
antagonism. It also helped galvanize support for Lincoln in the 1860
presidential campaign. If Lincoln had not been elected, secession would
not have occurred, and the war would not have been fought at that time.8
This is not to say that the war would never have been fought, but only that
it would not have erupted when it did.
Lincoln’s approach to secession was predictably resistant. He believed
that the Constitution precluded secession. Though Lincoln’s predecessor,
James Buchanan, was prepared to let the Union disintegrate, Lincoln was
unwilling to allow that to happen on his watch.
Simon devotes only three pages to Lincoln and the issue of secession.
Simon provides a superficial and incomplete discussion of Lincoln’s stance.
The only document Simon discusses in the context of Lincoln’s views on
secession is Lincoln’s First Inaugural Address.9 In his introduction, Simon
states that in this Address, Lincoln “insisted that the South had no legal
right to secede,” but he never explains Lincoln’s rich constitutional and
geopolitical analysis against secession.10 Much of Lincoln’s thinking on
the subject is contained in his first Annual Message to Congress in
December 1862,11 which is not mentioned by Simon.
II. SLAVERY
Simon’s discussion of slavery focuses on the Dred Scott case. Simon’s
analysis here is disappointing. He portrays Taney as being driven by a deep
pro-Southern bias which caused him to issue opinions which were rabidly
pro-states’ rights and pro-slavery opinions. Though Taney was entirely
dedicated to the South, he did not always side with the states’ rights and
slavery interests in cases that came before the Court.12 But in Dred Scott,
Taney’s sectional leanings wholly carried the day.

8. DON FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE 544 (Oxford Univ. Press 1978).
9. SIMON, supra note 1, at 3.
10. Id.
11. See 5 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 527 (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers
Univ. Press 1953) [hereinafter COLLECTED WORKS].
12. See, e.g., United States v. Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Peters) 518, 597 (1841) (holding slaves
to be free men); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 109-10 (1860) (holding that the
governor of Ohio could not be compelled to return a slave to the state of Kentucky); Ex Parte
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Taney’s Dred Scott opinion contained two important holdings:13 First,
that blacks, whether or not slaves, were not “citizens,” and therefore could
not sue in federal courts; and, second, that the Missouri Compromise, which
had barred slavery in certain federal territories, was unconstitutional.
Simon’s treatment of the first holding leaves much to be desired.14
Taney concluded that the Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the
case because diversity of citizenship was lacking. This followed largely
from his belief that blacks were not “citizens” of the United States. Taney
supported this finding by reviewing the condition of blacks in this country
and in England and other European countries. Taney’s survey yielded the
conclusion that blacks had “been regarded as beings of an inferior order,
and altogether unfit to associate with the white race . . . and so far inferior,
that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”15
Based on this, Taney also concluded that the signers of the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution shared a similar view and did not intend
to confer “citizenship” on blacks.
Simon claims that Taney’s negative comments about blacks were
written in a manner that purported to reflect his own views of blacks. 16
While Taney had a low opinion of blacks, it is unlikely he saw them in a
light much different than Lincoln.17 Simon, however, is considerably more
charitable in discussing Lincoln’s racial views than those of Taney.
Gordon, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 503, 504-06 (1862) (refusing to overturn a conviction of the crime of
piracy in the African slave trade). Moreover, in at least two opinions he issued as Attorney
General, Taney dealt with slavery-related issues in an even-handed way. In the first such opinion,
Taney expressed a view not supportive of slave owners. Taney opined that the government of the
United States cannot be required, in the absence of a treaty, to protect the right of a British master
over his slave when found in the United States. 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 475 (1831). In the second, he
opined that whether slaves brought back from abroad by their masters were now free depended
upon whether the slave had been domiciled abroad in a jurisdiction, which did not recognize
slavery. 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 479 (1831). If not, the slave would remain in bondage. Id. The second
opinion set forth an approach at odds with the choice of laws approach adopted by Taney in Dred
Scott in finding that the law of Missouri, the state to which Scott had returned, determined his
status.
13. A third, historically unimportant holding, was that Missouri law governed the question
whether Dred Scott remained a slave. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 324.
14. Taney’s discussion regarding the Missouri Compromise has rightly been criticized by
numerous scholars. Simon adds nothing new in his critique. In Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10
How.) 82 (1851), Taney passed on an opportunity to hold that Congress did not have authority to
ban slavery in the federal territories.
15. SIMON, supra note 1, at 122 (quoting Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407
(1856)).
16. Id. at 16, 126.
17. Taney, while a member of the Maryland State Senate, “supported both state legislation
and extra-governmental attempts to protect free negroes from abuses which were growing more
and more evident.” SWISHER, supra note 3, at 93. According to Swisher, Taney’s principal
biographer, Taney manumitted his own slaves and was generally humane in his attitudes towards
and dealings with blacks. Id. at 13, 92-94.
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More importantly, Simon is wrong to demonize Taney by arguing that
Taney’s statements in his Dred Scott opinion purported to reflect his
personal views of blacks. Though this portion might well have coincided
with his personal (low) view of blacks, the opinion did not purport to reflect
Taney’s personal views of blacks. Rather, Taney reached his conclusions
by drawing on what he understood to be the widespread, long-standing
view of society at large regarding blacks.18 Indeed, Taney states explicitly
that the “opinion [regarding blacks] was at that time fixed and universal in
the civilized portion of the white race. It was regarded as an axiom in
morals as well as in politics.”19
Simon does not take issue with the results of Taney’s historical survey
because Simon does not acknowledge it as a survey. Rather, he claims
Taney’s denial of citizenship to blacks reflected “the same conclusion
twenty-five years before he delivered his Dred Scott opinion . . . [when he
authored an opinion as Attorney General] which concluded that the
Constitution condemned African Americans to an inferior status in the
United States.”20 But the fact that Taney held the same view for twentyfive years does not make that view erroneous. Indeed, though not
mentioned by Simon, Lincoln agreed with Taney’s conclusion that blacks
were not citizens.21
Though Simon ignores Taney’s historical survey, it is regrettably true
that virtually all of what Taney said was an accurate rendition of the
condition of blacks throughout the Western world. Though we may wish it
were otherwise, it cannot be denied that Taney correctly stated that in the
Western world blacks had “been regarded as beings of an inferior order,
and altogether unfit to associate with the white race . . . and so far inferior
that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect?”22
Slavery was the product in extremis of these deep-seated racist attitudes.
Taney was not saying that things should be that way (though he may have
believed it); he was saying, instead, that they were that way.

18. “Notice that Chief Justice Taney [in his Dred Scott opinion] does not claim that blacks
are ‘a subordinate and inferior class of beings,’ but only that they were so viewed by the authors
of the Constitution.” G. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 456-57 (2005) (citing C.
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 303 (1922)).
19. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407.
20. SIMON, supra note 1, at 126. Simon erroneously cites the opinion as appearing at 2
Official Opinions of the Attorney General 475 (1831). Id. at 292 n.15. The opinion there, dated
December 6, 1831, dealt with slavery related issues, but it did not contain the analysis or language
about which Simon complains. Rather, the offending analysis and language are contained in a
June 9, 1832 opinion. SWISHER, supra note 3, at 152 & n.76. This opinion was never officially
published. Id.
21. DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 200 (1995).
22. SIMON, supra note 1, at 122 (quoting Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407) (emphasis added).
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Abolitionists might oppose slavery, but even many of them had an
exceedingly negative view of blacks. And not even the abolitionists could
deny that blacks had long been viewed with disdain by the bulk of the
Western world for many centuries. What else could account for their long
history of bondage?
Ironically, Taney’s description of how whites viewed blacks was
exemplified by Lincoln. In August 1862, shortly before issuing the
Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln met at the White House
with a small delegation of free blacks. Lincoln held that meeting in order to
encourage black leaders to support colonization of blacks outside the
United States. Lincoln proposed that the assembled blacks set an example
for all blacks by volunteering to start a colony. As a (perverse) inducement,
Lincoln told them:
[y]ou and we are different race. We have between us a broader
difference than exists between almost any other two races. . . .
[T]his physical difference is a great disadvantage to us both, as I
think your race suffers very greatly . . . by living among us, while
ours suffer from your presence . . . . [O]n this broad continent, not
a single man of our race is made equal of a single man of ours. . . .
It is better for us both, therefore to be separated.23
This is as stiff a tongue-lashing ever dealt by a president to fellow
Americans. It is as if Lincoln was trying to inflict emotional pain as he
spoke to the black attendees, perhaps to better motivate them to depart the
country.24 Lincoln had thus described, in considerably few words, but no
less explosive language than Taney, the degraded condition of blacks in the
United States, and why their ineluctably bleak future required separation
from whites and colonization abroad. His remarks were unquestionably “a
clear and unvarnished statement of the racial facts of life in mid-nineteenthcentury United States.”25
But Lincoln, in contrast to Taney, spoke for himself, and did not purport to speak for others. Lincoln added insult to injury by accusing blacks
of being responsible for causing the Civil War by allowing themselves to
become and remain enslaved.26 It has never been suggested that Taney ever

23. COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 11, at 371-72.
24. Lincoln’s indifference to “black pain” has frequently been acknowledged by scholars.
See generally Phillip Shaw Paladuan, Lincoln and Negro Slavery: I Haven’t Got Time for the
Pain, 27 J. ABRAHAM LINCOLN ASS’N 1 (2006), available at http://www.historycooperative.org/
journals/jala/27.2/paludan.html (discussing Lincoln’s views on slavery).
25. Id. at 19.
26. Lincoln stated: “But for your race among us there could not be war . . . . [W]ithout the
institution of slavery and the colored race as a basis, the war could not have had an existence.”
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communicated with or about blacks in the personal, ad hominem manner
which infected Lincoln’s behavior at the August 1862 meeting.
Though Simon reproduces much of Lincoln’s offensive language,27 he
does not condemn it. Instead, he palms it off to Lincoln’s desire to reach
“for a frictionless solution to the nation’s race problem.”28 One might well
ask: “Frictionless to whom?” Certainly not blacks.
The parallel between Lincoln’s comments and those contained in
Taney’s Dred Scott opinion eludes Simon. But it did not escape the
watchful eye of Frederick Douglass, who believed that Lincoln’s comments
showed “his pride of race and blood,” and his “contempt for Negroes.”29
Taney’s conclusion that blacks were not “citizens” was also based on
his understanding of the intent of the framers of both the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution. Simon is on firmer ground in challenging Taney’s conclusions here than with respect to the historical condition of
blacks.
There continues to be serious scholarly debate as to the extent to which
the Constitution protected slavery. But, it cannot reasonably be denied that,
on balance, the Constitution was more protective of, than hostile to, slavery
and the slave owning interests. Simon makes plausible, but stale, arguments that the framers did not intend to deny “citizenship” to blacks,
though there is a wealth of evidence pointing in the other direction. In
reality, there is no conclusive answer as to the intent of the Framers on this
important, now moot, issue.
Just as Simon paints an excessively negative picture of Taney, Simon
is less than diligent in his effort to paint a positive picture of Lincoln.
Though the reader would hardly know it from Simon, Lincoln was no less a
racist than Taney.30 Both men thought slavery was immoral.31 The only
difference was that Taney was a creature of the South and a defender of its
way of life, and Lincoln was not. Taney’s support of slavery appears to
COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 11, at 372. Frederick Douglass rightly commented that Lincoln’s
remarks were akin to a “horse thief pleading that the existence of the horse is the apology for his
theft or a highway man contending that the money in the traveler’s pocket is the sole first cause of
his robbery.” FREDERICK DOUGLASS, 3 THE LIFE AND WRITING OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 268
(Phillip S. Foner ed., 1975).
27. SIMON, supra note 1, at 217.
28. Id.
29. DOUGLASS, supra note 26, at 268.
30. See Robert Fabrikant, Emancipation and the Proclamation: Of Contrabands, Congress,
and Lincoln, 49 HOW. L.J. 313, 358-65 (2006) (discussing Lincoln’s views on race and slavery);
Paluduan, supra note 23, at 3.
31. SIMON, supra note 1, at 271. Taney had manumitted his slaves, and had done much
while in the private practice of law to alleviate the burdens of slavery. Id. He believed, however,
that blacks were better off being in bondage, rather than being free. Id. He also thought that
Southerners treated slaves more humanely than did Northerners. Id.
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have been incidental to his allegiance to southern mores, rather than an
endorsement of the “peculiar institution” per se.
Prior to assuming the presidency, Lincoln’s views on slavery are more
evident from his words than his actions. Lincoln’s opposition to slavery
was considerably more nuanced than portrayed by Simon (and most others).
For example, Simon notes that Lincoln represented a slave owner, Robert
Matson, attempting to retrieve some slaves, an African-American woman
and her four children, who had refused to return with him to Kentucky from
Illinois. Simon passes this off as a representation, which came to Lincoln
while he “was traveling outside his judicial district searching for additional
legal business.”32 Simon provides no support for this random speculation.33
More importantly, Simon fails to address whether Lincoln’s representation
of Matson bears on the depth and quality of his opposition to slavery. I
have argued elsewhere that it does, and will not repeat those arguments
here.34
Even apart from his questionable representation of Matson, there are
many reasons for looking askance at Lincoln’s opposition to slavery. He
did not support abolition of slavery in states where it already existed.35 He
expressed strong support for enforcement of the fugitive slave laws.36 And,
his opposition to slavery in the District of Columbia when he was a Congressman in 1847 came in the form of a proposal, which hinged on the
approval of a majority of white voters in the district.37 He did not forcefully push his plan, and he never formally introduced it as a bill in the
House of Representatives.38
Prior to becoming President, Lincoln opposed only the extension of
slavery in places where it did not already exist. Reputable scholars have
pointed out that Lincoln’s stance reflected a desire to keep the territories
free for whites.39 If so, this would be a thin reed to rely upon in hoisting up
Lincoln as the “Great Emancipator.” While Simon does not lay that accolade on Lincoln, Simon’s account gives little sense of the complicated
32. SIMON, supra note 1, at 271.
33. For an excellent review of Lincoln’s representation of Matson, see MARK E. STEINER,
AN HONEST CALLING: THE LAW PRACTICE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 103-36 (2006). There are no
documents which indicate how Lincoln came to represent Matson, but Steiner points out that
Matson had counsel prior to retaining Lincoln. Id. at 112.
34. See Fabrikant, supra note 30, at 360-62 (arguing Lincoln’s representation of Matson
proved a willingness to protect the legal rights of slave owners). Robert Fabrikant, Is Past
Prologue? 83 N.D. L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2007).
35. Id. at 335-37.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 364-65.
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nature of Lincoln’s opposition to slavery and of his checkered path to
issuing the Emancipation Proclamation. At all points along the way Simon
tilts the emancipation story in favor of Lincoln, and very often it is
unjustified.40
Simon seems inclined to attribute more anti-slavery accomplishments
to Lincoln than he deserves. For example, Simon claims that the 1862
legislation emancipating slaves in the District of Columbia was “[t]he only
tangible result of” Lincoln’s lobbying Congress to pass a resolution supporting voluntary, compensated, gradual emancipation by slave states.41 In
fact, the initiative for the legislation came from within the Congress itself,
not from Lincoln. Indeed, Lincoln delayed signing the measure to accommodate slave owners.42 Throughout the War, the Civil War Congress was
markedly in front of Lincoln with respect to the issue of emancipation.43
Simon also errs when he characterizes the 1862 District of Columbia
emancipation statute as calling for “compensating slave owners who freed
their slaves—an idea that Lincoln had first advocated as a congressman
from Illinois in 1849.”44 The 1862 statute did not give slave owners a
choice as to whether to emancipate their slaves. They were compelled to do
so. The 1862 statute enacted by Congress was significantly more emancipatory than Lincoln’s failed proposal as a Congressman.
III. THE PRESIDENT’S WAR POWERS
The onset of the Civil War caused President Lincoln to exert
unprecedented powers as President and Commander-in-Chief. This exertion covered a broad array of areas, including emancipation, blockading
southern ports, spending money, raising an army, and suspending the writ
of habeas corpus. Much of Simon’s discussion of this issue is confined to
the latter area.

40. Thus, for example, Simon explains that Lincoln’s decision to reverse General Fremont’s
order emancipating slaves in Missouri was based on Lincoln’s concern that Fremont’s order
“contradict[ed] the [First] Confiscation Act [FCA] (which required a judicial hearing before a
slave could be freed).” SIMON, supra note 1, at 203. Though Lincoln did, in fact, request that
Fremont revise his order to bring it into compliance with the FCA, it is unlikely that Fremont’s
order violated the FCA. As I have argued elsewhere, Lincoln’s reliance on the FCA was
“pretextual.” Fabrikant, supra note 30, at 351. In any event, contrary to Simon, the FCA did not
require a judicial hearing before a slave could be freed, nor did Lincoln rely upon this ground in
revising Fremont’s order. Id. at 321-29, 391-98.
41. SIMON, supra note 1, at 215.
42. Fabrikant, supra note 30, at 336-37.
43. See generally id. at 313 (arguing that Lincoln’s contribution to emancipation is
overstated).
44. SIMON, supra note 1, at 215.
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Simon’s decision not to cover the Emancipation Proclamation is
surprising because Lincoln’s issuing that document represented perhaps the
most powerful exertion of presidential war power in our history. Simon
gratuitously opines that
[g]iven the opportunity, there is no doubt that Taney would have
declared Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation unconstitutional.
He could have documented his conclusion by citing his own
judicial opinions in [which he held that] . . . the Constitution [gave
the states] exclusive control of the institution of slavery to the
states where it existed.45
Undoubtedly, Taney would have ruled against the Proclamation had he
been given the chance, but it is unlikely that he would have relied upon the
cited cases. Those cases did not involve an exertion of presidential war
powers, and are therefore entirely distinguishable from the situation
presented by the Emancipation Proclamation, which had been expressly
promulgated as a war measure. Moreover, the hypothetical analysis on
behalf of Taney put forward by Simon was at odds with The Prize Cases 46
from which Taney dissented.47 There are other grounds, however, which
might have proved more fruitful in attacking the Proclamation.48
President Lincoln’s decision to suspend, without Congressional authorization, the writ of habeas corpus is an often-told story, and Simon offers
nothing new. The short of it is that the Constitution expressly provides that
the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended during “cases of rebellion or
invasion.”49 The Constitution does not state, however, who may suspend
the writ, but since this provision appears in Article I, Section 9, it is
difficult to resist the conclusion that only Congress may suspend the writ.
Lincoln’s suspension of the writ was challenged in a case in which
Taney sat as a circuit judge, not as Chief Justice. Taney rightly ruled that
Lincoln was without authority to suspend the writ, and demanded that the
45. SIMON, supra note 1, at 222 (citing Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1851);
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)).
46. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
47. Simon also cites Ex Parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
Merryman provides better support for Simon’s position than the other decisions he cites because
it, as did the Emancipation Proclamation, involve an exercise of the Presidential War Power. In
Merryman, however, a specific constitutional provision seemed to undercut the President’s position, whereas the Constitution contains no provision dealing with the issue of emancipation. Ex
Parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. at 148. Moreover, emancipation of southern slaves is tantamount
to confiscation of military assets in a foreign country. In contrast, the suspension of habeas at
issue in Merryman did not occur in the theater of war, but in the domestic realm. Id. at 147.
48. See Fabrikant, supra note 30, at 370-71 (noting three constitutional concerns with the
Final Proclamation).
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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prisoner be released. The military, undoubtedly acting under orders from
the Commander-in-Chief, refused to comply with Taney’s order. Realizing
that he lacked the muscle to compel the military to act, Taney caused his
order to be delivered directly to Lincoln so that he could determine the
appropriate course of action. The matter ended there, with no further
official action being taken by either Lincoln or Taney.
The upshot of this confrontation, which was lost by Taney, is that
Lincoln considered having Taney arrested, and continued to issue proclamations suspending habeas corpus until the war ended. But before he did
so, he obtained advance Congressional authorization. After the war ended,
the Supreme Court sans Taney essentially vindicated Taney’s position.50
Simon’s recounting of this unusual series of events is even-handed, but it
does not contain the rich analysis found in other works, especially Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s relatively recent book.51
Simon repeats the canard that Lincoln always referred to the hostilities
between the North and the South as a “rebellion, not a civil war.”52 Simon
claims that this “distinction was important to [Lincoln] because[,] . . .
[among other things, it] provided Lincoln with the constitutional rationale
to take extraordinary emergency measures to put down the insurrection . . . .”53 Simon has stood things on their head in two important
respects.
First, contrary to Simon, Lincoln often referred to the hostilities as a
“war,” including in his Gettysburg Address, where he lamented, “we are
engaged in a great civil war.”54 Second, characterizing the hostilities as a
“rebellion,” while consistent with Lincoln’s view that the South had no
right to secede, would result in less, not more, legal power to wage military
campaigns against the South. If the hostilities were merely a domestic
“rebellion,” then the Constitution would govern the conduct of military
operations. If, on the other hand, the hostilities constituted a “war,” then
military operations were governed by the more relaxed standards of the
international law of war, not the Constitution.55 As made clear by the
Supreme Court in its 1863 decision in The Prize Cases, nomenclature
standing alone would not control whether the Constitution or the international law of war governed the hostilities.

50. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 140 (1866).
51. See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
WARTIME (1988).
52. SIMON, supra note 1, at 196.
53. Id.
54. Fabrikant, supra note 30, at 318 n.20.
55. Id. at 318-19.
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Simon also discusses at length The Prize Cases, which is the most
important case decided by the Court during the War. Lincoln blockaded
southern ports in April 1861, and Congress declared the existence of a state
of war in July 1861 and (retroactively) validated the blockade. Four ships
were seized after the blockade was imposed but before Congress acted.
The ship owners and others challenged the seizures on the grounds that the
blockade was illegal because Congress, not Lincoln, had the power to
declare war, and that a declaration of war was a precondition to Lincoln’s
imposing a blockade. The Court, by a 5-4 margin, upheld Lincoln’s unilateral imposition of the blockade, and found that the hostilities between the
North and South were governed by the international law of war, not the
Constitution.
The Prize Cases constituted a monumental vindication of the entirety
of the war effort by the federal government, but it does not deserve nearly
the attention it has received from Simon. First, unlike Dred Scott, Taney
did not write for the Court. In fact he did not write at all. Rather, he joined
a dissenting opinion written by another justice. Thus, he was no more than
a second rank antagonist.
Second, Simon overstates the significance of the disagreement between
the majority and the dissenters. The majority believed Lincoln did not need
Congressional authorization to blockade southern ports. The dissenters
believed he did, and also believed that the subsequent Congressional
authorization could not retroactively validate the blockade. Thus, the
dissenters believed that the North had fought the war unconstitutionally for
approximately three months. The dissenters did not argue that Congress’
declaration of war was inoperative on a prospective basis, but only on a
retrospective basis. Nor did the dissenters argue that the Constitution,
rather than the international law of war, governed the hostilities after
Congress’ declaration of war. Thus, if the dissenters had prevailed the
North’s ability to fight would not have been crippled.
Simon also expresses concern that if the dissenters had prevailed that
“the president himself would have been presented to the world as a grand
scofflaw who had flouted both the Constitution and international law.”56
But Taney had, in effect, branded Lincoln as a scofflaw in the habeas
controversy, yet Lincoln emerged unscathed domestically and internationally. It borders on the theatrical to say that if the dissenters had prevailed they “would then have produced a judicial calamity from which the
Union might not have recovered.”57
56. SIMON, supra note 1, at 232.
57. Id.
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Even if the case had gone against the Union, it is unlikely that
Congress or the President would have adhered to the Court’s decision.
Lincoln had already flouted judicial authority in the habeas corpus litigation
presided over by Taney, and there is no reason to think he, or Congress,
would have taken a compliant stance if the Court had ruled against it in The
Prize Cases.
Simon’s book is not likely to satisfy the serious Civil War scholar,
particularly one looking for a good legal read. My advice would be to
bypass this book, and read the leading biography on Lincoln, the leading
one volume history of the Civil War, and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s book on
the habeas corpus crisis.58 While this represents considerably more work
than reading Simon, it is worth the effort.

58. DONALD, supra note 21; JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM, THE CIVIL
WAR ERA (1988); REHNQUIST, supra note 51.

